Market Performance of Low-Cost Entry into the Airline Industry: A Case of Two Major Japanese Markets  by Murakami, Hideki
This paper was awarded STX Prize 2008.
Associate Professor of Kobe University, Japan, E-mail: hidekim@panda.kobe-u.ac.jp
*
**
Hideki MURAKAMI          001
Multi Criteria Decision on Selecting Optimal Ship
Accident Rate for Port Risk Mitigation
Contents
Introduction                                              Implications for Market Welfare 
An overview of new Japanese carriers           Empirical Results 
The empirical model                                Concluding Remarks
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
Market Performance of Low-Cost Entry into the Airline Industry: 
A Case of Two Major Japanese Markets*
Hideki MURAKAMI**
Abstract
This is an empirical analysis of the dynamic changes in consumer surplus 
and industry profits after a low-cost carrier (LCC) enters markets, performed 
by estimating structural demand and price equations using unbalanced 
carrier-specific panel data of two to four carriers on nine routes for four to 
eight years (130 samples).  Our findings are that gains in consumer surplus 
were substantial for as long as two years after market entry, but losses began 
in the third year, when two of the LCCs agreed on a code share with All 
Nippon Airways (ANA), a full-service carrier; since the third year, those 
carriers seem to have regained profitability.  Our conclusion is that Japanese 
regulatory sectors, which have allowed full-service carriers other than ANA 
to engage in behavior that drives LCCs out of competitive markets while also 
allowing the code-shares between ANA and LCCs, seem to stand by the 
industry instead of consumers.
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This political decision is the so-called “45-47 regime” or “Aviation constitution”, which was still in effect in 1986.
Kitakyushu, with its population above one million, is located in Fukuoka prefecture, but inconvenient access by public transportation 
prevents it from being a secondary airport to Fukuoka Airport.
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I. Introduction
Japan’s domestic air markets have long been tightly regulated in 
entry-exit, price, and quality competition, even after a minor revision of the 
regulations in 1986.  In 19721, the Ministry of Transport (MoT) granted to 
Japan Airlines (JAL), more than two-thirds of which was owned by the 
Japanese national government, the right to operate only in international 
markets and in thriving trunk routes in domestic markets.  MoT also granted 
to All Nippon Airways (ANA) the right to operate not only in domestic trunk 
routes together with JAL but also in thriving local markets originating 
mainly in Tokyo (Haneda) and Osaka (Itami). Moreover, it granted Toa 
Domestic Airlines (TDA, later renamed Japan Air System, JAS, which then 
merged with JAL in 2004) the right to operate only in local domestic markets 
with low demand. In 1986, MoT permitted ANA and JAS to enter 
international markets and, conversely, JAL to enter domestic local markets 
in addition to trunk routes.  MoT also privatized JAL in 1987.  However, no 
new carriers were founded at that time.
In 1996, responding to the worldwide tide of deregulation, MoT allowed 
for the foundation of two carriers and let them enter domestic markets.  One 
was Hokkaido International Airways (called Air Do, with the code ADO), 
which was founded by bankers and farm entrepreneurs in Hokkaido who had 
complained about expensive airfares. Their claim was that the three 
full-service carriers (JAL, ANA, and JAS) set very high prices through 
collusion and that these inflated fares were damaging the regional economies 
in Hokkaido, which were highly dependent on air transportation to and from 
the Tokyo area.  The other was Skymark Airlines (its code is SKY), which 
was founded by a travel agency, HIS. HIS was motivated to create new 
demand for package tours by issuing much cheaper tickets than the 
full-service carriers did.  In 1998, ADO and SKY entered the Tokyo-Sapporo 
and Tokyo-Fukuoka markets, respectively, which are the largest and 
second-largest city-pair routes in the world in terms of demand size.  SKY 
also entered the Osaka-Sapporo and Osaka-Fukuoka markets.
In 2000, MoT deregulated airfares and entry/exit in domestic markets, and 
two other airlines were newly founded, Skynet Asia (SNA) and Star Flyer 
(SFJ).  In 2002, SNA entered the Tokyo-Miyazaki market, followed by the 
Tokyo-Kumamoto and Tokyo-Nagasaki markets, which are long-distance 
city-pair routes with few surface transportation modes to compete with 
airlines.  SFJ started operating in the Tokyo-Kitakyushu market2 in 2006 
The Ministry of Transport merged with the Ministry of Construction in 2001 and was reorganized as MLITT.3
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and then entered the Tokyo-Kansai (Osaka) market in 2007.
While new carriers have entered these markets, some of them have exited 
after losing money as a result of fiercely competitive behaviors taken by the 
full-service carriers.  For example, when SKY entered the Tokyo-Fukuoka 
market, the incumbent full-service carriers matched their fares almost 
exactly.  They did the same in other routes SKY entered, and as a result SKY 
exited from Osaka-Sapporo and Osaka-Fukuoka only one year after entering 
those markets.  
Using 130 firm-specific unbalanced panel data of 6 carriers for 8 years and 
43 route-specific unbalanced panel data of 9 markets for 8 years, we 
investigated how the fares dynamically change from pre-entry to post-exit 
situations throughout the fare-war periods and computed the cumulative 
welfare effects by estimating a simultaneous demand and fare equation 
system.  Focusing on new entrants’ strategies and cost structures, in the next 
section we present an overview of the characteristics of new Japanese 
carriers and comment on whether new carriers deserve to be called low-cost 
carriers. In Section III we review previous studies, and we present 
demand-price system equations geared toward economic welfare 
implications.  In Section IV we explain how to derive the consumer’s surplus 
and total welfare, and in Section V we explain our dataset and present our 
empirical results. Finally, we discuss the social welfare effect based on the 
empirical results in Section V, highlighting two major markets, 
Tokyo-Sapporo and Tokyo-Fukuoka.  
II. An overview of new Japanese carriers
Although the Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport 
(MLITT3), some Japanese academics, and the mass media call ADO, SKY, 
SNA, and SFJ “low-cost carriers” (LCCs), it seems doubtful that they should 
be classified in the same category as Southwest, Ryan, or Jet Blue, because 
these carriers’ service still offers frills and their cost level is not much lower 
than that of the full-service carriers.  Their service characteristics are 
summarized in Table 1. Here we will compare these airlines’ service 
characteristics with those of US and European LCCs.
Unlike Southwest Airlines, none of the new carriers can choose to make 
secondary airports their base.  Only SKY appears to be similar to the LCCs 
in the United States, such as Southwest Airlines in the 1990s, in terms of 
* The Ministry of Transport merged with the Ministry of Construction in 2001 and was reorganized as MLITT.
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no-frills service, high discount ratios, very limited mileage service, and 
independence from legacies. ADO, SNA, and SFJ more or less rely on the 
managerial support of ANA, so they will not compete fiercely enough to 
break the order of the industry, although they did that when they first began 
operations. In addition, all of these new carriers except for SKY offer 
more-frills service like that of the new-generation LCCs such as Jet Blue.  
However, Jet Blue flies transcontinental routes requiring passengers to be 
comfortable for five in-flight hours, and some frills are helpful for that,  
while most Japanese routes are less than two in-flight hours, so the need for 
frills is lower. 
<Table 1>   Characteristics of new Japanese carriers
Note: This table is quoted from Murakami (forthcoming).
*1: Discount tickets are available for pre-purchasing, students, and the handicapped, and for inhabitants
      of Hokkaido and businesspeople working for companies in Hokkaido.
*2: Discount tickets are available for pre-purchasing, students, and the handicapped.  Cygnus class offers 
      more wide-pitched, comfortable seats than those in the economy class for 1,000 yen more than the 
      economy fare.
*3: Available for buyers who pay using the Skymark Visa/MasterCard.
*4: Designated travel agents.
*5: SKY once allied with JAL in 2005 in the Tokyo-Osaka (Kansai) and Tokyo-Kobe markets but termi
      -nated this alliance quickly.
*6: Discount tickets are available for pre-purchasing, round-trip, students, and the handicapped.
*7: One free ticket for every 10 flights. 
 ADO  SKY  SNA  SFJ  
Seating class  Economy*1  Economy and 
Cygnus 
class*2  
Economy*6  Economy*6  
Discount ratio  
at its first entry  
against FSC’s 
airfare  
 
36%  
 
50㧑  
 
32.3%  
 
17%  
Fleet configuration  B767 and B737  B767 and B737  B737  A320  
Frequent Flyer 
Program  
Yes  Limited*3  Limited*6  Yes  
 Method for 
booking  
tickets  
Internet,  
Toll -free tel, 
Mobile phone,  
Ticket desk  
Internet, Tel, 
Mobile phone,  
Travel agent*4,  
Ticket desk  
Internet,  
Toll -free tel, 
Mobile phone  
Internet, Tel, 
Mobile phone,  
Travel agent*4,  
Ticket desk  
Free in -flight 
service and/or 
amenity  
Nothing for 
B737; radio & 
music for B767  
Nothing (even 
for Cygnus 
class)  
Beverages  
(coffee, soft 
drinks)  
Sweets,  
beverages  
(coffee, drinks)  
Code -share/  
Partnership  
ANA, SNA  None*5  ANA, ADO  ANA  
Base airport  Sapporo  
(Shin -Chitose)  
Tokyo  
(Haneda)  
Miyazaki  Kita -Kyushu  
 
* The Ministry of Transport merged with the Ministry of Construction in 2001 and was reorganized as MLITT.
Hideki MURAKAMI          107004
Market Performance of Low-Cost Entry into the Airline Industry : A Case of Two Major Japanese Markets
As for costs, it is doubtful whether we can call these new Japanese LCCs, 
since their unit costs do not much differ from those of the legacies.  Figure 
1 shows the difference in retail price index (RPI)-adjusted unit costs between 
legacies and LCCs as well as the change in those costs over time.  They are 
adjusted by the RPI with a basis in 1998 prices.
Figure 1 shows that the unit costs of ADO and SKY in their entry years 
were at least as high as those of full-service carriers, despite the fact that 
their fares were, respectively, 36% and 50% below the legacies’ fares at that 
time. This illustrates that these two new carriers were seriously 
deficit-ridden for the first four years after their foundation. These new 
carriers cannot achieve low cost because the government tax, fuel prices, 
maintenance costs, and airport charges are the same among all Japanese 
airlines, and because Japan does not have secondary airports in its 
metropolitan areas, such as Chicago Midway, which would charge cheaper 
landing fees.  New carriers can choose to relegate maintenance to low-cost 
foreign companies, but due to problems with the quality of those foreign 
services, the new carriers currently have their aircraft maintained by their 
rivals, the full-service carriers.  Only in labor costs can new carriers spend 
less than full-service carriers, and this labor cost difference equals the cost 
difference in Figure 1.
In addition to the high cost structure of the new airlines, what makes them 
worse off is the pricing strategy of the full service carriers, which seem to 
have tried to drive their new competitors out of the market by matching their 
fares. As a result, for example, ADO’s cumulative deficit reached 61 million 
US dollars (USD) for the first 4 years, and it filed for protection under 
Japan’s Corporate Reorganization Law (Minji-Saisei-Hou) in 2002.  Since 
then, it has been reorganized by code-sharing with ANA, and the company 
paid off its debt in 2005, a year earlier than scheduled.  SNA has taken a very 
similar path to that of ADO, and it is now code-shared with ANA.  Only SKY 
was able to reduce its costs to 20% lower than the highest-cost carrier, JAS, 
between 2001 and 2002; it remains independent of full-service carriers and 
is still struggling in competition with them.  Now, due to the increases in fuel 
price and the unchanged airport charge or tax system, the costs of the new 
entrants are rising. As a result, the unit cost difference is 20% at maximum 
(for ANA and ADO) and 7% at minimum (JAL and SKY/SNA).  Therefore, it 
is unclear whether we can regard the new entrants as LCCs, at least from a 
statistical viewpoint, but for convenience we call them LCCs hereafter. 
45
Although we use the same econometric model and dataset as those used in Murakami (forthcoming), our analytical viewpoint is different 
and we believe the estimated result is improved.
Later on we will compute the consumers surplus using the demand equation here, so we have to choose the form of demand equation 
carefully to derive consumers surplus as correctly as possible.  In order to choose the correct form of demand equation, we carried out the 
LR test using Box-Cox transformation.  The test result is that                    which means that “linear model” hypothesis is rejected at 1% 
level.  Therefore, we chose the log-linear form.
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<Fig. 1>   Changes in carriers’ unit costs from 1998 to 2005
Source: Murakami (forthcoming)
 
III. The empirical model
As stated above, Japanese full-service carriers have responded to low-cost 
entrants by cutting fares, and they seem to have tried to expel the new 
entrants.  Our interest is in how great the route-specific social welfare gain 
has been since the new entry of LCCs and, for two routes where the 
competition ended, we want to know how great the welfare loss was after the 
LCC exited.  To determine this, we need to know (a) how the price and 
demand have dynamically changed from the pre-entry situation to the years 
of the fare-war; (b) in the route from which the LCC exited, whether (or how 
much) the price recovered after the competition ended; and c) the yearly 
profit/loss of each carrier.  
The effect of low-cost entry on prices is empirically estimated by Dresner 
and Windle, Morrison, Goolsbee and Syverson, and Olivelia.  In our analysis 
we chose to follow the method proposed by Dresner and Windle in which one 
estimates the structural form of demand and price equations that incorporate 
dummy variables for both single and multiple LCC entries, and our analysis 
revealed that many of dummy variables take statistically significant minus 
values. Our structural model also consists of demand and price (pseudo-sup
-ply) equations but is tailored to fit the Japanese case.4 The demand and price 
equations are as follows5:
G Unit Cost (TC/RPK, including int'l operation)
12
14
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1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
Ye
n 
(1
 U
SD
=1
20
ye
n)
JAL
ANA
JAS
ADO
SKY
SNA
G 3.1212 )1( =χ
006
6 Needless to say, the demand and the price have the simultaneous relation, and the cost function is the function of output and input prices in 
our economic theory.  Therefore, these variables are endogenous.  As for the market share, we performed Hausman test to test the null 
hypothesis that the log of MSHE is neither asymptotically correlated with the error terms of the demand nor that of the price equation.  The 
test results are that                  for the demand equation and                    for the price equation.  Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected at 
5% level and we regard the market share variable is endogenous. 
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where      is the price of carrier k at route i in year t,          is the arithmetic 
average of per-capita income of route i in year t,           and  is the distance 
of route i.      is the cross-price term,       and  is positive as long as inter-firm 
rivalry exists between full-service carriers and LCCs.         is the arithmetic 
average of the Origin/Destination population in year t,          is the number 
of departures of carrier k at route i in year t, and  is the JAL-JAS merger’s 
dummy variable. For MJJ  the three elements of JAL’s years 2003, 2004, and 
2005 take 1, and all the other elements take 0.                                            , 
                are the dummy variables showing the dynamic effect of an LCC’s 
entry.  For example, the elements of            are 1 for ADO’s first year of entry 
and 0 for the other years of ADO and the other carriers, and the observation 
of          is 1 for the first year of any LCC’s entry.  Therefore,          ,        , 
              reflect the strategy full-service carriers took against LCCs.   
shows the market share of carrier k at route i in year t.  This structural 
equation has five endogenous variables.  Considering the demand and supply 
system, it would make sense to assume that demand, own price, cross price, 
and marginal cost are endogenous.  In addition, a carrier’s market share is 
determined by the market structure, and it is also assumed to be 
endogenous.6
Similarly, the structural equation system for an LCC (carrier 4) is as 
follows:
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7 See Fischer and Kamerschen (2003), pp. 235-237.
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where j is the full-service carrier having the lowest fare among JAL, ANA, 
and JAS. Since we assume a case of four-carrier oligopoly, we must have 
three cross-price terms in the demand equation.  However, full-service 
carriers set almost the same fares as each other, and the matrix of the demand 
equation would be close to singular if we introduced three cross-price terms.  
Therefore, we introduce one cross term, and by doing this we mean that three 
full-service carriers pay attention to the LCC’s fare while the LCC sets its 
fare below the lowest fare or the collusion fare of the full-service carrier(s).
As for the dummy variables related to exit, we have created the dummy 
variables EXJ, EXA and EXD to show the effect of the fare-restoring 
behavior of legacies.  These variables are each 1 for the full-service carriers’ 
elements of the next year of an LCC’s exit to see the price-restoring behavior 
in the year after an LCC exits. EXH is the dummy variable to show ADO’s 
fare-restoring behavior after the exit of full-service carriers.  The element of 
EXH is 1 for the year after a full-service carrier’s exit.
         is the route marginal cost of carrier k at route i in year t.  To estimate 
the route-specific marginal cost for each carrier, Fischer and Kamerschen 
(2003) jointly estimate a translog total cost function and share equations 
obtained by Shephard’s lemma to arrive at each carrier’s marginal cost7 by 
using Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR). They then approximate the 
route-specific marginal cost for each carrier.  The SUR method is frequently 
used to estimate system equations, which requires a sufficient number of 
samples to ensure consistency of the variance to be obtained by maximum 
likelihood estimation.  However, since Japan had only three major airlines 
until 2002 and now has only two, the sample numbers of our unbalanced 
panel dataset, which take 20 years for the time-series dimension, would be 
less than 60.  In addition, since no Japanese LCCs have officially disclosed 
their labor or capital-material cost and related data, we cannot incorporate 
these LCCs into the dataset for our cost analysis.  Therefore, it is hardly 
possible to arrive at the marginal cost by estimating the translog cost 
function. Alternatively, we use the following proxy to approximate the 
route-specific marginal cost for each carrier, as proposed by Brander and 
Zhang and Oum et al. :
 
    
G kitMC
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L
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DistACMC
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=   (5) 
008
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See Brander and Zhang (1990), pp. 572-575; Brander and Zhang (1993), pp. 417-420 and Oum, Zhang, and Zhang (1993), pp. 175-178. 
Armantier and Richard (2003), pp. 468-469.
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where the superscript L denotes each carrier, including an LCC (L=1,2,3,4), 
and         is the aggregate average cost of carrier L at year t,         is the 
distance of route i regardless of time, and            is the average distance flown 
by airline L at year t .8  
Many studies on airline costs, such as Caves, Christensen, and Tretheway, 
and Gillen, Oum, and Tretheway show that the economies of density exist in 
the airline industry. This means that the total cost function is strictly 
concave.  Therefore,     in equation (5) ranges between 0 and 1.  It is apparent 
that if    is 0, the carrier’s marginal cost is proportional to distance, while if
 is 1, the marginal cost is indifferent to distance.  Brander and Zhang 
performed a sensitivity analysis in which    takes 0.25, 0.50 (they call this 
the “base case”), and 0.75; they determine which value is closest to the real 
case.  Other studies, which do not use the same methods as are used here, 
derive    , and CCT implies that    =0.15 and Borenstein implies that    =0.67.
In their estimation of the airline demand and price equation, Armantier and 
Richard predict that the route-specific marginal cost of an airline is just 
equal to the product of “cost per mile” and distance (this means     =0).9 
Therefore, study authors thus far have found it difficult to estimate the 
route-specific marginal costs of carriers.  The most comprehensive way to 
approximate the marginal cost with small samples that do not bear the 
estimation of translog cost function seems to be that proposed by Oum, 
Zhang, and Zhang.
IV. Implications for Market Welfare
In this section we demonstrate how to compute the change in market 
welfare, referring to each carrier’s price and output after an LCC enters, 
following the method used in Murakami (forthcoming).  Our method is 
simply to compute the triangle surrounded by the intercept of the demand 
function, output, and price before and after an LCC’s entry, and compare the 
results.  The “benchmark” for computing consumer welfare is the triangle 
surrounded by the horizontal intercept of the demand curve,        , the 
pre-entry price,        ,  and the corresponding market output      .  Both  
and        are estimated values computed from the simultaneous equations.  
The superscript i denotes the market, that is, i = Tokyo-Sapporo, 
Tokyo-Fukuoka, Tokyo-Asahikawa, Tokyo-Aomori, Tokyo-Tokushima, 
Tokyo-Miyazaki, Tokyo-Kagoshima, Osaka-Sapporo, and Osaka-Fukuoka, 
G LtAC G iDist
G LtAFL
Gλ
Gλ
Gλ
Gλ
Gλ
G
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G
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G iKInt ,0
G iKp ,0 G
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See Brander and Zhang (1990), pp. 572-575, Brander and Zhang (1993), pp. 417-420, and Oum, Zhang, and Zhang 
(1993), pp. 175-178. 
Armantier and Richard (2003), pp. 468-469.
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and K is the carrier in the market including the LCC.  Letting this benchmark 
consumer surplus be       , we can describe the          of a market as follows:
 
where          is the carrier-specific demand function defined as (1) and (3) in 
the last section. We then compute the size of the triangle surrounded by      ,
    and the horizontal intercept of the demand curve adjusted by a 
carrier-entry dummy variable,         . The subscript t denotes the years after 
the LCC entry, and the subscript 0 denotes the years before LCC entry.  
Letting the post-entry consumer surplus be        , we can describe      as 
follows:
 
We take the ratio                      and show the change in consumer surplus 
graphically.   
After we compute the consumer surplus, we deduce the total welfare by 
summing consumer surplus and a proxy of producer surplus.  We define 
producer surplus as the route-specific profits of carriers.  Utilizing the 
information applied in equation (5), we can easily compute the 
route-specific average cost and thence the carrier’s route-specific profit.  We 
use carrier profit as a proxy of producer surplus because we may not be able 
to find the true producer surplus, since the oligopolistic Japanese airline 
industry may not have a supply curve.
V. Empirical Results
The data sources for carrier costs, passengers, and flight frequency are 
Koku Tokei Yoran (JAA Civil Aviation Handbook), published by the Japan 
Aeronautic Association, and Koku Yuso Tokei Nempo (Yearly Statistical 
Survey of Japanese Aviation), published by the Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, and Transportation (MLITT). The fare information is 
obtained from Jikoku Hyo (a monthly published timetable of railways and 
airlines). The demographic data sources are Kakei Chosa Hokoku (Family 
Income and Expenditure Survey), published by the Japan Statistics Bureau, 
and web pages of related prefectures and cities.  The statistics on fares, 
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population, flight frequency, and income are data from April, when airline 
demand is the lowest, in each year studied.  We used April data because we 
could recognize a carrier’s fare strategies best in that month, since carriers 
issue many varieties of discount tickets to convert potential demand to actual 
purchases.  The descriptive statistics and the partial correlations between 
continuous variables are shown in Table 3 and Table 4 in Appendix.
Information for computing consumers surplus is obtained from the 
following simultaneous equations of carrier-specific demand and price in 
Table 2. 
<Table 2>   Empirical Results of Demand and Price Equations
Note: Estimated by Iterative 3SLS and n=130. 
 * : this tests the hypothesis that all the variables except for constants in the system equations equals zero.  
**: Significant at 1% level 
Demand Equation  Parameter  t - Stat.  P - Value  
Own Price Elasticity  - 0.670  - 2.155  0.031  
Cross - Price Elasticity  0.329  1.858  0.063  
Distance  0.461  2.224  0.026  
Population  0.452  2.877  0.004  
Income  2.198  4.175  0.000  
Frequency  1.162  26.930  0.000  
Market Share  0.276  3.312  0.001  
1st year of ADO  0.085  0.459  0.646  
2nd year of ADO  - 0.010  - 0.049  0.961  
3rd year of ADO  - 0.173  - 0.687  0.492  
4th and further years of ADO  - 0.244  - 1.687  0.092  
1st year of SKY  - 0.018  - 0.080  0.936  
2nd year of SKY  - 0.021  - 0.125  0.901  
3rd year of SKY  - 0.280  - 1.834  0.067  
4th and further years of SKY  - 0.213  - 1.390  0.165  
1st year of SNA  - 0.704  - 2.960  0.003  
2nd year of SNA  - 0.602  - 2.591  0.010  
3rd year of SNA  - 0.727  - 2.963  0.003  
JAL - JAS Merger  - 0.175  - 2.626  0.009  
CONSTANT  24.483  3.880  0.000  
 Price (Pseudo - supply) Equation  Parameter  t - Stat.  P - Value  
Output  - 0.300  - 2.959  0.003  
Route Marginal Cost  1.184  9.273  0.000  
F requency  0.318  2.523  0.012  
Market Share  0.221  4.838  0.000  
1st year of JAL  - 0.176  - 2.455  0.014  
2nd year of JAL  - 0.042  - 0.612  0.541  
3rd year of JAL  0.081  0.999  0.318  
4th and further years of JAL  - 0.112  - 1.558  0.119  
1st year of ANA  - 0.100  - 1.230  0.219  
2nd year of ANA  - 0.026  - 0.272  0.786  
3rd year of ANA  - 0.072  - 0.831  0.406  
4th and further years of ANA  - 0.079  - 0.861  0.389  
1st year of JAS  - 0.028  - 0.221  0.825  
2nd year of JAS  - 0.146  - 1.871  0.061  
3rd year of JAS  0.000  0.006  0.995  
4th year of JAS  0.272  2.099  0.036  
Post - exit Price of JAL  0.035  0.343  0.731  
Post - exit Price of ANA  0.148  1.325  0.185  
Post - exit Price of JAS  0.333  2.946  0.003  
Post - exit Price of ADO  0.007  0.034  0.973  
CONSTANT  - 0.691  - 0.590  0.555  
System R - Square  0.985  
Test of overall significance*  Chi- square(d.o.f=19)=544.8**  
R - square of demand equation  0.954  
R - square of price (pseudo - supply) equation  0.564  
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As for the continuous variables, the signs of the parameters are correct, 
though we introduce the quadratic term of per-capita income on the 
right-hand side of the demand equation.  To see the entry effects of LCCs, we 
need to compute the sum of the intercept of the demand function and the 
parameters of carrier dummy variables.  Since we place the full-service 
carrier dummy variables on the right-hand side of the price equation for the 
“identification” reason of simultaneous equations, we have to compute the 
effects on demand of the full-service carrier’s reaction to LCC’s entry, by 
way of the parameter of own price (that is, 㧙0.67) in the demand function.  
Before performing welfare analysis using the results of the econometric 
model, we do a preliminary analysis of how the price per distance has 
changed from the LCC pre-entry year to their post-exit year.  Figure 6 
describes the change in prices per distance.  Each is the passenger-weighted 
average of six carriers. We have nine routes for the pre-entry year and for the 
first year of LCC entry.  The low-cost competition ended within a year in 
Osaka-Sapporo and Tokyo-Aomori, and within two years in Osaka-Fukuoka 
and Tokyo-Asahikawa.  For these four routes, we observe the full-service 
carrier’s prices after an LCC exited.  For the other five routes, the cost 
competition has continued for more than three years.  Therefore, we don’t 
observe a post-exit price.
<Fig. 2>    Dynamic change in market average price before, during, 
                  and after competition between LCCs and full-service carriers   
Note: The vertical axis is airfare in Japanese yen per mile, and the horizontal axis is the n-th year of LCC 
entry (“Preent” is the pre-entry average price per distance, “4<” denotes the average price per distance at 
the fourth year and after, and “exit” denotes the average price of full-service carriers after an LCC exits).
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Figure 2 shows that the pre-low-cost-entry price is about 29 yen per mile, 
and that when an LCC enters, the price drops by 25%.  In the routes in which 
low-cost competition ended within one or two years, the initial significant 
price drop reversed, eventually exceeding the pre-entry price, probably 
because the full-service carriers tried to compensate for the loss incurred 
during the price war (see the dotted and dashed lines which jump from 1 to 
exit and from 2 to exit, respectively).  In the routes in which the price wars 
last for more than four years, the price is restored close to the pre-entry price 
in the third year.  
<Fig. 3>    Change in output and price in the Tokyo-Sapporo market
Note:  is the actual market demand,                    , and            is the passenger-weighted average of       . 
In this figure,                 .  ‘Preent’ stands for the pre-entry year.
 
Next, we demonstrate the welfare changes computed from our econometric 
model.  This model can describe the welfare issues in greater detail than the 
simple descriptive statistics such as Figure 2.  We discuss the cases of 
Tokyo-Sapporo and Tokyo-Fukuoka, the largest and second-largest markets 
in Japan, respectively.  First, we trace the change in the estimated price 
adjusted by retail price indices, and we estimate two kinds of corresponding 
output in our simultaneous equations as well as real values.  
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<Fig. 4>    Change in output and fares in the Tokyo-Fukuoka market
                        
Note: For the definitions of                 , see the note with Figure 7.
Figures 3 and 4 imply that (1) estimated market prices declined 
significantly as soon as an LCC entered, and low prices were maintained for 
the first two years; (2) from the first year for Tokyo-Sapporo, and from the 
second year for Tokyo-Fukuoka, there seems to be a period when the market 
size may have very slightly expanded (the demand curve shifted up a little), 
since the price and real output moved in parallel. The reason for the lack of 
increased market demand is probably that Tokyo (Haneda) was already so 
congested that LCCs were not able to increase the market share, and 
therefore their impact on creating demand was also limited.  In our model, 
not only in the case where both prices and output go up but also in the case 
where prices go down and output increases, we cannot intuitively determine 
whether consumers surplus increased, because the horizontal intercept of 
demand function sometimes moves inward.  Therefore, we need to compute 
the triangles using the carrier dummy variables, which affect the intercept of 
the demand equation as well as the (estimated) output and price.   
Figures 5 and 6 describe the change in two kinds of consumers surplus 
using the real values of price and output (    ), as well as using estimated 
output and price in our simultaneous equation (      ).  In the graphs of Figures 
5 and 6, our estimated results (    ), which predict that consumers surplus 
curves will slope down in the long run, look “pessimistic” compared with the 
case using real values. 
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<Fig. 5>    Change in consumers surplus in the Tokyo-Sapporo market
<Fig. 6>    Change in consumers surplus in the Tokyo-Fukuoka market
However, for Tokyo-Sapporo and Tokyo-Fukuoka, consumers surplus 
increased in the first year and first two years, respectively, of LCC entry but 
decreased from the second and third years, respectively, even though the 
markets expanded.  The total consumers surpluses from the first years can be 
summarized as follows: the surplus decreased in Tokyo-Sapporo even from 
the optimistic viewpoint (1% decrease) as well as from the pessimistic 
viewpoint (6% decrease).  As for Tokyo-Fukuoka, consumers surplus may 
have increased by 1.5% from the optimistic computation using real values, 
but it decreased by 7.5% from the pessimistic computation by estimated 
output and price.  Therefore, we cannot conclude that consumers surplus 
increased (or not) by SKY’s entry into the Tokyo-Sapporo market.  However, 
it may be inferred that a decrease in consumers surplus was more likely to 
take place in the future than an increase, because the        curve looks parallel 
to the horizontal axis from the third to fourth years and after, even if we 
accept the computation of th real value (    ) c se.
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At this point we will comment on the social welfare issues.  Figure 7 shows 
the change in real profit of the industry (the sum of each carrier’s profit).  
The changes in profits move in the opposite direction from the changes in 
consumers surpluses.  The industry’s profit in the pre-entry year (1998) is 44 
million USD in Tokyo-Sapporo and 46 million USD in Tokyo-Fukuoka. 
Profit dropped significantly in the first year of new entry but recovered and 
even surpassed the previous levels in the third year (63.5 and 75.6 million 
USD, respectively) and stabilized from the fourth year on.  In other words, 
competitions among carriers started to be softened from the third year, and 
this phenomenon seems to be consistent with the theory of multi-market 
contact proposed by Bernheim and Whinston (1990). 
<Fig. 7>    Change in industry profit (1=1998)
Judging by the results shown in Figures 5, 6 and 7, we conclude that social 
welfare may have decreased in Tokyo-Sapporo in the second year of new 
entry, since both consumers surplus and industry profit decreased compared 
with those in the pre-entry year.  As for other years, there were a certain 
amount of welfare transfers from the industry to consumers in the first year 
and vice versa in the third and later years.  Considering the percent changes, 
it seems that the losses generated in the industry surpass the gains in 
consumers surplus in the first year of new entry as well as the second year in 
Tokyo-Fukuoka, so social welfare may also have decreased.  It also appears 
that, recently, industry profit has surpassed the loss in consumers surpluses, 
so social welfare may have increased.  From the viewpoint of welfare 
economics, these phenomena should be positively evaluated, but the problem 
remains in terms of the protection of consumers.*
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At least, this is true of SFJ, according to the interview of Mr. T. Moriuch, Executive Director of Star Flyer, Inc., on 
September 25, 2007. 
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Appendix
<Table 3>   Descriptive statistics of continuous variables
䇭
<Table 4>   Partial correlations between continuous variables
䇭
㩷  average sample S.D. minimum maximum median 
distance 942.815 179.925 578.000 1161.000 1023.000 
marginal cost 17388.713 2870.022 10119.370 22860.617 17684.529 
departure 425.831 320.772 14.000 1291.000 300.000 
market share 33.077 19.026 1.966 100.000 33.708 
passenger 93740.292 88371.073 1599.000 324299.000 54981.500 
own price 25230.000 6400.289 10000.000 35000.000 25500.000 
cross price 22956.923 6294.583 10000.000 35000.000 23000.000 
population  4043192.785 624600.272 2110791.623 4828613.654 4023659.226 
income 420634.003 19071.968 369972.647 491846.624 418880.474 
 
㩷  distance 
marginal
cost    departure 
market
share 
passenger
 
own 
price 
cross 
price Popu
 
lation  
income
 
distance 1.000                 
marginal cost 
0.785 1.000               
departure 
0.217 0.313 1.000             
market share 
0.060 0.261 0.411 1.000           
passenger 
0.223 0.335 0.963 0.435 1.000         
own price 
0.572 0.635 0.214 0.432 0.176 1.000       
cross price 
0.429 0.285 
-
0.040 
0.053 
-
0.081 
0.504 1.000     
population  
0.261 0.281 0.421 
-
0.137 
0.442 0.105 0.004 1.000   
income 0.243 0.210 0.253 0.141 0.160 0.298 0.355 0.147 1.000 
 
